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Abstract 
Since 2012 several central banks have introduced a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) aimed at 
boosting real spending by facilitating an increase in the supply and demand for bank loans. We 
employ a bank-level dataset comprising 6558 banks from 33 OECD member countries over 2012-
2016 and a matched difference-in differences estimator to analyze whether NIRP resulted in a 
change in bank lending in NIRP-adopter countries compared to those that did not adopt the policy. 
Our results suggest that following the introduction of negative interest rates, bank lending was 
weaker in NIRP-adopter countries. The result is robust to a wide range of checks. This adverse 
NIRP effect appears to have been stronger for banks that were smaller, more dependent on retail 
deposit funding, less well capitalized, had business models reliant on interest income, and operated 
in more competitive markets.  
 
 
JEL: E43, E44, E52, G21, F34 
Keywords: Negative interest rates, monetary policy transmission, bank lending, difference in 
differences estimation, propensity score matching 
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 resulted in the worst economic recession in advanced 
economies since the 1930s. Central banks initially responded by reducing policy interest rates 
sharply. When these rates approached zero without there being the hoped-for recovery in nominal 
spending, many central banks experimented with a range of unconventional monetary policies 
(UMP) to provide further stimulus, including large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) to raise asset 
prices and increase the supply of bank reserves, targeted asset purchases to alter the relative prices 
of different assets, and forward guidance to communicate about future policy rate paths. The 
effectiveness of these policies in raising nominal spending has been at the center of a vigorous 
policy and academic debate with no clear consensus emerging. Nonetheless, since 2012 six 
European economies (Denmark, the Euro area, Hungary, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) and 
Japan have taken unconventional monetary policy a step further by introducing a negative interest 
rate policy (NIRP) aimed at additional monetary accommodation.1 The primary objective of NIRP 
in adopter countries is to stabilize inflation expectations and support economic growth, and in 
Denmark and Switzerland the policy was also aimed at discouraging capital inflows to reduce 
exchange rate appreciation pressures (see Jobst and Lin, 2016). Support for the real economy was 
expected to come from a greater supply and demand for loans, with loan supply increasing as 
banks ran down their (large) excess reserve balances, and loan demand increasing in response to a 
further fall in lending rates. As for UMP more generally, NIRP fueled debate on the likelihood that 
it would be successful (see, for example, Arteta et al. 2016; Ball et al. 2016; Jobst and Lin, 2016). 
The key issues relate to NIRP’s efficacy and limitation in stimulating economic growth and 
inflation, as well as how the policy influences bank profitability, financial stability, and exchange 
rates. Skeptics of NIRP (for example, McAndrews, 2015) point to several possible complications, 
including a limited pass-through to lending rates as banks may hold deposit rates steady to maintain 
their deposit funding base. Such behavior has an adverse influence on bank profitability, which 
can limit credit growth if banks charge higher lending rates or fees to cover losses, or if a 
                                               
1 See Bech and Malkhozov (2016) for a discussion of the implementation mechanisms of NIRP in adopting countries. 
The time of introduction of NIRP is noted in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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diminished capital base makes banks more reluctant to lend. Other associated distortions in asset 
valuations can create asset price bubbles threatening financial stability.  
The empirical literature on NIRP and its effects is small and generally comprises overviews of 
developments in key banking and other financial aggregates in the immediate pre- and post-NIRP 
periods rather than rigorous econometric analysis (see Section 2). Our paper contributes to the 
literature by examining how NIRP has performed with respect to a key policy objective--achieving 
an increase in bank lending to support economic growth. To examine this issue, we employ a bank-
level dataset comprising 6558 banks from 33 OECD member countries over the period 2012-2016 
and a matched difference-in-differences approach. This approach provides a sound basis for 
drawing conclusions as to whether NIRP resulted in a change in bank lending in pre-and post-
NIRP periods and whether NIRP-adopter countries improved bank lending compared to countries 
that did not adopt the policy. It also allows us to examine factors that might have been influential 
in the effectiveness of NIRP compared to other monetary policy approaches. In contrast to the 
conclusions of most of the recent research in the area, we find that banks in NIRP-adopter countries 
reduce lending significantly compared to those in countries that do not adopt the policy. This 
adverse NIRP effect is stronger for banks that were smaller, more dependent on retail deposits, 
less well capitalized, had business models reliant on net interest margins, and operated in more 
competitive market environments.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related academic literature on NIRP. Section 
3 introduces our data and methodology. Section 4 presents our results along with several 
robustness checks to address threats to validity and a final section concludes. 
2. Related literature 
 
Until the global financial crisis, the benchmark monetary theory for many macroeconomists drew 
upon Wallace (1981) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who viewed liquidity as having no 
further role once nominal policy rates reached their lower bound. After the crisis, various studies 
highlight mechanisms through which UMP (policy guidance, LSAPs and NIRP) can have an 
impact. Curdia and Woodford (2011) provide a model with heterogeneous agents and 
imperfections in private financial intermediation to demonstrate that UMP will affect the economy 
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providing either an increase in banks’ reserves to boost lending to the private sector, or that UMP 
changes expectations about future interest-rate policy. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) show 
that UMP can work against adverse feedback loops that precipitate crises by affecting the prices 
of assets held by constrained agents. Drechsler et al. (2016) point out the role played by LSAPs, 
equity injections, and asset guarantees in supporting risky asset prices. Del Negro et al. (2017) 
investigate the effects of interventions in which the government provides liquidity in exchange for 
illiquid private paper once nominal interest rates reach the zero bound. Similarly, Brunnermeier 
and Koby (2016) present a “reversal interest rate” hypothesis according to which there is a rate of 
interest at which accommodative monetary policy “reverses” its effect and becomes 
contractionary. The reversal interest rate depends on such factors as the composition of banks' 
asset holdings, the degree of interest rate pass-through to loan  and deposit rates, and banks funding 
structures - they argue that quantitative easing increases the reversal rate  and should only be 
employed after interest rates cuts have been exhausted.2 
 
UMP relates to policies that guide longer-term interest rate expectations and expand and change 
the composition of central bank’s balance sheets (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). It is aimed at 
facilitating credit expansion in order to boost economic growth. However, little is known about 
the effectiveness and pass-through of unconventional policy to bank lending. Studying the Term 
Auction Facility, Berger et al. (2017) find an increase in both short- and long-term lending for 
most loan categories. Focusing on the effect of UMP on bank lending in the U.S, Rodnyansky and 
Darmouni (2016) confirm that quantitative easing and mortgage backed securities purchases 
facilitated an increase in mortgage lending. However, Chakraborty et al. (2017) show that 
increased mortgage lending may crowd-out commercial lending at the same time.  Bowman et al. 
(2015) examine the effectiveness of the Bank of Japan’s injections of liquidity into the interbank 
market in promoting bank lending (using bank-level data from 2000 to 2009). They report a robust, 
positive, and statistically significant effect of bank liquidity positions on lending suggesting that 
the expansion of reserves associated with UMP likely boosted the flow of credit (although the 
overall increase was modest). Butt et al. (2014) report no evidence of a traditional bank lending 
                                               
2 Our later empirical analysis tests dimensions of the Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) hypothesis. 
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channel associated with LSAPs in the UK and suggest that this was because it gave rise to deposits 
that were likely to quickly leave banks.3 
 
The effect of NIRP is expected to be transmitted via lower money market and bank lending rates 
to households and corporates (Jobst and Lin, 2016). These lower rates impact both sides of bank’s 
balance sheets. When lower policy rates are transmitted to bank loan rates, they reduce the value 
of bank assets. Conversely, lower policy rates also reduce the cost of bank liabilities, namely, 
lower funding expenses. Heider et al. (2017) find that when policy rates remain positive, deposit 
rates closely track policy rates. However, when policy rates turn negative, banks that rely on 
deposit funding are reluctant to reduce deposit rates fearing a loss of their funding base. In cases 
where sticky deposit rates compress lending margins, banks tend to shift activities toward fee-
based services. Ball et al. (2016) survey recent developments in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in NIRP-adopter countries. They argue that policy rate cuts below zero are generally 
transmitted to bank lending rates, although sluggishly. They also conclude that there is no clear 
relationship between NIRP and bank credit expansion. Arteta et al. (2016) suggest that lending 
rates generally decline under NIRP, particularly in countries with greater bank competition, but 
the pass-through is only partial due to downward rigidities in retail deposit rates (reflecting the 
importance of retail deposits as a source of bank funding). In two recent studies that focus on NIRP 
in the Euro area Bräuning and Wu (2017) suggest that negative rate policy reduces loan rates and 
boosts lending to businesses and households. In a similar study using bank level data, Demiralp et 
al. (2017) also find that banks increase lending as a reaction to NIRP. However, the latter studies 
may provide misleading inferences as the authors do not compare the differential effects of policy 
rates on bank lending behaviour in NIRP adopter and non-adopter countries.  
 
Empirical analysis of the impact of NIRP is also linked to the bank lending channel literature. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Altunbas et al. (2014) provide evidence of the bank lending channel 
for the transmission of conventional monetary policy. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) find that low 
short-term interest rates for an extended period soften lending standards for household and 
                                               
3 A related literature focuses on the broader macroeconomic effects of LSAPs (e.g., Lenza et al. 2010; Baumeister and 
Benati, 2013; Fujiwara, 2004; Berkmen, 2012; Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2013; Kapetanios et al., 2012) and generally 
finds a positive—albeit often small—impact of LSAPs on output and inflation.  
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corporate loans. Jimenez et al. (2014) show that lower overnight interest rates induce less 
capitalized banks to lend to riskier firms and Jimenez et al. (2012) illustrate that tighter monetary 
policy and deteriorating economic conditions substantially reduce lending by distressed banks. 
Agarwal et al. (2018) estimate banks’ marginal propensity to lend out of a decrease in their cost of 
funds to show that banks were reluctant to lend to riskier borrowers in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. Our paper makes a significant contribution to the empirical literature on the impact 
of UMP on bank lending by focusing specifically on the effectiveness of the most recent UMP 
innovation: the adoption of negative central bank policy rates.   
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
The empirical strategy aims at identifying the causal effect of NIRP on stimulating bank lending. 
For this purpose, we combine propensity score matching (PSM) with difference-in-differences to 
investigate the impact of NIRP on bank lending in NIRP affected countries compared with non-
affected countries. Since the decision to undertake NIRP is not random but dictated by monetary 
authorities based on inflation target and macroeconomic conditions, it may suffer from 
endogeneity and selection bias, as there can be unobservable factors correlated with both the 
treatment and with bank lending. We attempt to mitigate this counterfactual issue by constructing 
a control sample using propensity score matching, proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The 
predicted probability (propensity score) of NIRP to be undertaken by a country is obtained from 
the estimation of a Probit model. Monetary authorities typically make policy decisions based on 
their forecast of the performance of the economy. Thus, we use forecasted macroeconomic 
variables (output gap and inflation rate) to match banks operating in NIRP-adopter and non-
adopter countries. Furthermore, to make sure that the propensity score predicted from the Probit 
model is successful in controlling for bank-specific differences between treated and the 
comparison group in the pre-NIRP period, we include bank size, bank equity strength, and 
profitability in the propensity score estimation.  The propensity score matching model can be 
represented as follow: 
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𝑝" = Pr(𝐷" = 1| 𝑋") = 𝛿(𝑋"-𝛽 + 𝜀") 
 
(1) 
                                                                      
where 𝐷"	  is a dummy variable describing the treatment status. D=1 if the bank has been affected 
by the policy, and D=0 otherwise. 𝑋"	  is a vector of observable forecasted macroeconomic variables 
and bank characteristics in the two years prior to NIRP and δ is a standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. Specifically, we implement Kernel Matching (Heckman et al. 1998) with 
weighted averages of all the banks in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. 
The advantage of using Kernel matching is the relatively smaller variances resulting from the fact 
that more information is used in the estimation.  
 
The major concern of the matching approach is that the NIRP decision is likely to be driven by 
unobservable characteristics. In this case, the Conditional Independence Assumption linked with 
the propensity score matching approach is unlikely to hold. Since these unobservable country level 
characteristics are time-invariant, we implement the matched difference-in-differences estimator, 
which compare the conditional pre- and post- treatment bank lending with those of the untreated 
countries (Heckman et al. 1998 and Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002). The combination of PSM 
with a difference-in-differences approach extends the propensity scores matching method by ruling 
out the unobservable heterogeneity and relaxing the Conditional Independence Assumption.  
 
In the next step, we estimate the average treatment effect with a matched difference-in-differences 
approach. This matched difference-in-differences estimator can be obtained by applying weighted 
least squares to the matched data set. Using a difference-in-differences estimator to compare 
matched bank lending between NIRP and non-NIRP affected banks prior to and after NIRP 
introduction, our baseline specification takes the following form:  
 Δ𝐿"45 = 𝛼 + 𝛽78𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑"4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡45C + 𝜑5 + 𝛾4 + 𝜀"45   (2) 
 
where Δ𝐿"45 is the growth rate of lending (measured by gross, mortgage and commercial & 
industrial loans) of bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑"4 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡45 is a dummy 
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variable that takes the value 1 after the period that country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 decided to implement NIRP 
and 0 before that period, and 𝛽7 represents the average difference in the change in bank lending 
between countries that switched to NIRP and countries that didn’t lower interest rates to break the 
zero lower bound. The majority of NIRP countries in our sample introduced NIRP in 2014, hence 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡45 takes the value 1 from 2014 year-end. However, since Sweden, Norway and Switzerland 
introduced NIRP in 2015 for these the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡45 dummy is equal 1 from 2015 year-end4. We also 
include 𝜑5, and 𝛾4, to capture, respectively, year and country fixed effects to limit the potential for 
bias in estimates of 𝛽7. 5 
 
 
3.2 Data 
 
We rely on Jobst and Lin (2016) for dating the adoption of NIRP regimes and construct a dataset 
combining information from two main sources. The macroeconomic series are from Thompson 
DataStream and the OECD database. The bank balance and performance data are from Orbis Bank 
Focus. Since Orbis comprises cross-country banks that operate in more than one country, balance 
sheet data can be either consolidated or unconsolidated. To avoid concerns regarding banks that 
operate in more than one country in both treated and non-treated groups, we use bank account data 
that are either unconsolidated (U1 and U2 codes in Orbis) or consolidated but not with an 
unconsolidated subsidiary. Our sample covers commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative 
banks and bank holding compaies from 33 OECD countries over 2012 - 2016, giving us a total of 
                                               
4 To be more specific regarding the dummy variable timings we look at the accounting reporting date of all banks in 
our sample as there are banks that report in different periods of the year and others just at the end. If a bank reports in 
a period that is before or in the same month of the date of introduction we set the dummy post at 0. Orbis Bank Focus 
allows you to distinguish between these banks as it gives the reporting accounting date for all the banks in our 
sample. For Europe NIRP was introduced in June 2014, so we set the dummy variable post equal 1 from the end of 
2014, and also for Denmark and Hungary. The six months gap between date of introduction and the dummy post are 
essential to investigate the effect on lending. For countries like Sweden and Switzerland that introduced NIRP at the 
beginning of 2015 (January for Switzerland and February for Sweden) the dummy post is set equal 1 for banks that 
report accounting data either in the middle of the year or at the end.  
5 We include country-specific dummies to control for time-invariant, unobservable country characteristics that can 
shape bank lending. We include year fixed effects to control for possible shocks over the sample period that can affect 
bank lending such as other monetary policies and changes in regulation. All regressions are estimated with bank-level 
clustering, namely allowing for correlation in the error terms. We use robust standard errors to control for 
heteroscedasticity and dependence (see Bertrand et al. (2004); Petersen (2007) and Donald and Lang (2007).  
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23,247 observations.6 There are 20 countries in the treated group and 13 countries in the control 
group.7 Descriptive statistics for the bank lending series, other bank balance sheet variables, and 
the macroeconomic series in the treatment and control groups of countries are shown in Table 1.  
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for bank lending. In a recent study on monetary 
stimulus and bank lending, Chakraborty et al. (2017) find that in response to the Federal Reserve’s 
asset purchases, banks shift resources away from C&I lending into mortgage origination. To take 
this potential crowding-out effect between bank lending activities into consideration, we group 
bank lending behaviour into three types: gross loans, mortgage loans and C&I loans. We use the 
logarithm growth rate of gross loans, mortgage loans and commercial and industrial (C&I) loans 
as our measures of interest.  
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics on other bank balance sheet data, including bank 
size (log(TA)), equity ratio (E/TA), profitability (ROE), liquidity ratio (Liquidity), total capital 
ratio (Capital), funding structure (Funding_Structure), and income structure (Income_Structure). 
In a recent theoretical study, Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) suggest that monetary policy may 
have unintended contractionary effects on lending due to bank capital constraints, bank business 
models and market competition. To empirically test the hypothesis of Brunnermeier and Koby 
(2016), we also include variables that account for bank funding and income structures and the 
Hirshman-Herfindahl market structure index (HHI) to proxy the impact of bank competition.  
 
Earlier literature also highlighted the major transmission channels of other UMP policies including 
central banks’ asset purchase programs (Di Maggio et. al, 2016; Rodnyanski and Darmouni, 2017; 
Kandrac and Schulsche, 2017; Chakraborty et. al, 2017). In-line with Gambacorta et al. (2014), 
we employ the logarithm growth rate of a country’s central bank balance sheet as a further control 
to isolate the impact of other UMP’s on bank lending behavior.  
 
                                               
6 The sample period is intentionally short. According to Roberts and Whited (2013) and Bertrand et al. (2004) the 
change in the treatment group should be concentrated around the onset of the treatment. Moving away leads to 
unobservable and other factors that affect the treatment outcome threatening the validity of the model. 
7 We exclude Japan in our sample as the country only adopted NIRP in early 2016, which provides too short of a 
period to examine the impact of NIRP on bank lending.  
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Another issue is that bank lending may be driven by loan demand from households and corporates. 
To address this concern, we construct loan demand indices based on data from the ECB and FED 
bank lending surveys. Both of these surveys identify loan demand as the need of enterprises and 
households for bank loan financing, irrespective of whether a loan is granted or not.8 Based on 
data from these two surveys, we construct loan demand indices for the Euro area and US, focusing 
on increases or decreases in loan demand. Panel C of Table 1 presents summary statistics of 
macroeconomic conditions, monetary policy and loan demand indices.   
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
 
Despite the fact that we use PSM to match countries with similar forecasted macroeconomic 
variables, it can be argued that a reduction in bank lending is driven by weak economic prospects. 
To gain further insight, in Table 2, we provide country level average lending growth rates before 
and after NIRP. Panel A shows before and after NIRP average lending growth for NIRP-affected 
countries while Panel B is for counties that did not experience NIRP. Although the results suggest 
that both NIRP- affected and non-affected countries experienced a reduction in bank lending after 
the treatment period, the reduction in lending experienced by NIRP-adopter countries was larger 
and the difference between mean lending in the two periods for this group was statistically 
significant.   
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Propensity score matching  
 
                                               
8 The bank lending surveys from ECB and FED are available at:  
1)   https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/  
2)   https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html  
 
 11 
Propensity score matching is implemented to mitigate the issue of selection bias. To establish an 
adequate control group we match countries according to pre-treatment characteristics. The results 
from the Probit model, that are used to generate propensity scores of being affected by NIRP, are 
presented in Table 3. As displayed, the majority of the covariates are significant at the 1% level 
suggesting that banks operating in countries with weaker economic prospects represented by lower 
forecasted inflation (CPI_forecast) and wider forecasted output gap (Output_gap) have a higher 
probability of being affected by the negative interest rate policy. Moreover, countries with banks 
that are small (Size), with lower profitability (ROE), and that are less capitalised (Capital) tend to 
have a higher probability of being the target of NIRP.  
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
 
4.2 Combined PSM Difference-in-Differences estimator  
 
The PSM approach reduces but does not eliminate the selection bias caused by unobservable time 
invariant country-characteristics. Thus, we implement the combined PSM difference-in-
differences estimator to remove the unobserved heterogeneity. The results from the PSM matching 
difference-in-differences estimations are presented in Table 4. The dependent variables are the 
(natural logarithm) growth rate of gross loans (GL_GR), mortgage loans (MORT_GR) and 
commercial and industrial (CL_GR) loans. In column 1 of Table 4 with GL_GR as the dependent 
variable, the coefficients on NIRP is sizeable, negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that countries, in which central banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in total 
bank lending of around 8.7% relative to those countries in which central banks did not follow this 
policy. The remaining columns with MORT_GR and CL_GR as dependent variables demonstrate 
similar results with negative and significant coefficients on NIRP. The sizeable, negative and 
statistically significant results on NIRP indicates that countries that implemented NIRP 
experienced a decline in bank lending relative to those in which central banks did not follow this 
policy. Negative rates break the zero lower bound of interest rates. However, banks rely on deposit 
funding and are reluctant to pass-on the negative rates to depositors. Due to this imperfect pass-
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through the narrower margins add pressure on banks to reduce lending. Our results are in-line with 
Heider et al. (2017).  
 (Insert Table 4 here) 
 
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
 
In this section, we take an in-depth exploration of the transmission of negative rates on bank 
lending. The results also serve as robustness checks of our baseline model. 
 
NIRP was brought into the UMP mix by central banks together with the adoption of other 
unconventional monetary policies, most particularly extensive outright asset purchases, and it is 
important to disentangle the effects of NIRP on lending from the effects of these policies. Outright 
asset purchases were aimed at expanding the central bank’s balance sheet to increase the level of 
the monetary base in order to boost nominal spending (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). We proxy 
for the use of other UMPs by including the log of the growth rate of central bank total assets to 
take account of central bank balance sheet size. The results reported in panel A of Table 5 are for 
each of the three categories of bank lending and suggest that NIRP and central bank asset purchases 
had the opposite impact on bank lending. Other UMPs are positively associated with bank lending 
growth but the coefficients on NIRP remain negative and significant. Thus, the estimates suggest 
that NIRP did not manage to achieve the intended results of stimulating bank lending and economic 
growth. On the other hand, other UMPs appear to have been more effective in boosting bank 
lending. 
 
Our second robustness check aims to control for the effect of credit demand on bank lending 
behavior. To this end, we make use of indicators of loan demand from the U.S Federal Reserve 
Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices and the ECB’s Euro Area 
Bank Lending Survey, both of which have elements focused on the need of firms and households 
for bank loan financing (irrespective of whether the loan is granted). We construct monthly credit 
demand indices from the aforementioned ECB and Federal Reserve surveys. These results are 
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reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 of panel B (Table 5) where the coefficient on NIRP remains negative 
and statistically significant for gross and C&I loans. The results demonstrate that the negative 
relationship between NIRP and bank lending is not driven by loan demand. In column 4 of panel 
B (Table 5) we report the result with Loan demand as the dependent variable. The result reveals a 
positive relationship between loan demand and the dummy variable for the NIRP-effect, which 
indicates an increase in loan demand in treated countries. The result suggests a gap between loan 
supply and loan demand in NIRP adopter countries and confirms that the reduction in bank lending 
is not driven by loan demand.  
 
For a third robustness check, we alter our country sample where the treatment group includes only 
European countries so the control group includes only European non-NIRP adopters.9 These 
results are reported in panel C of Table 5. The coefficients on NIRP-effect in the cases of gross 
loans and mortgage loans remain negative and statistically significant. However, in a sample 
within the EU, C&I loans and NIRP- effect demonstrates a positive and significant relationship.  
 
The motivations for Denmark and Switzerland to adopt NIRP was focused on discouraging capital 
inflows to reduce exchange rate appreciation pressures; a policy fundamentally different from 
other treated countries. In the fourth robustness check, we remove Denmark and Switzerland from 
our sample. The results are reported in panel D of Table 5 and show the coefficient on the NIRP 
dummy remains negative and significant, which confirms our baseline results.   
 
As a final robustness test, we try to eliminate the possibility that bank behavior in the treatment 
group may have altered prior to the introduction of NIRP—for example, in anticipation of adverse 
effects of NIRP, or for some bank-specific reasons—thereby invalidating our choice of difference-
in-differences estimation. We model false NIRP periods for 2012 and 2013. If the estimated 
coefficients on the ‘false’ NIRP are not statistically significant or negative, we can be more 
confident that our baseline coefficient is capturing a genuine monetary policy shock. The results 
are reported in panel E of Table 5. The coefficients on the NIRP dummy are positive and 
                                               
9 We follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) that use different control groups as 
a further test to control for the omitted variables problem. Multiple control and treatment groups reduce biases and 
unobservable variables associated with just one comparison. 
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statistically significant in the cases of gross loans, and positive and insignificant in the case of 
mortgage loans and C&I loans adding further support to the validity of our baseline results. The 
results also reaffirm and strengthen the conclusion of our baseline results that differential bank 
lending behavior was driven by NIRP.  
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
4.3 NIRP and the reverse interest rate hypothesis 
 
In this section, we report results from a test of aspects of the Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) 
‘reversal rate hypothesis’ within a matched difference-in-differences framework by creating 
NIRP-adopter treatment groups and non-adopter control groups according to whether banks meet 
representations of bank-specific factors that these authors suggest might reduce bank lending in a 
low interest rate setting.10 Specifically, we focus on banks’ capitalization, funding structure, 
business model, interest rate exposure, and competitive conditions in the banking market. First, 
we examine the impact of bank capital on lending by grouping banks in the treatment and control 
groups according to whether they have total capital ratios above or below the median for banks in 
our sample, labelling banks with higher than median capital ratios as ‘well-capitalized’ and those 
below the median as ‘under-capitalized’. The results for the different categories of loans are 
reported in panels A and B of Table 6.  In panel A, the coefficients on NIRP-effect for all the 
categories of bank lending are negative and statistically significant suggesting a substantially 
larger decline in lending by under-capitalized banks after the introduction of NIRP. Panel B 
exhibits different results in the group of well-capitalized banks. The coefficient on gross loan is 
smaller in magnitude and the coefficients on mortgage and business loans turn positive, indicating 
a mixed and unclear effect of NIRP on bank lending in the group of well-capitalized banks. This 
is consistent with the Brunnemeier and Koby’s (2016) assertion that suggests that in situations of 
economic uncertainty and changing regulation, binding capital requirements can limit the pass-
through of monetary policies to bank lending. These results are also in-line with Carlson et al. 
                                               
10 As already mentioned in section 4.2, splitting control and treatment groups in different sub-groups allows us also to 
reduce bias and unobservable variables associated with just one comparison. 
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(2013) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). Both studies show the importance of capital as a 
buffer against monetary policy shocks on lending. 
 
Second, we consider how NIRP interacts with bank funding structure. We distinguish between 
retail deposit based and wholesale funding based banks on the assumption that if interest rates on 
retail deposits are more downwards sticky then the introduction of NIRP would likely pose greater 
limitations on retail deposit based banks to increase lending (Sääskilahti, 2018). We consider as 
retail deposit banks those with retail deposits greater that 50% of total liabilities. This is confirmed 
by the results reported in panels C and D of Table 6, where the coefficients on NIRP are highly 
negative and significant in all the three categories of bank lending for deposit-based banks but 
indicate that NIRP resulted in a unclear relationship with bank lending for wholesale funding based 
banks. The result is consistent with the argument of Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) that NIRP enabled 
wholesale-funded banks to take greater advantage of the decline in funding costs and provide more 
loans.  
 
We assess the impact of banks’ business models on lending in a NIRP context by distinguishing 
between traditional interest-dependent banks from those that have a more fee-dependent business 
model. For our purposes, a bank is defined as interest-dependent if the interest earnings share of 
total earnings is above the median for banks in our sample; banks are deemed to be fee-based if 
their interest earnings share is below the median. If interest rates on retail deposits are sticky 
downwards then the introduction of NIRP would likely pose more constraints for banks with 
interest-dependent than fee-dependent business models. The results from these estimates are 
reported in panels E and F of Table 6 and show that banks whose business model is mainly interest-
based reduced their lending by more than banks whose business model was more fees orientated.  
 
Our final test of the Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) hypothesis is to assess the impact of NIRP on 
lending in the context of competitive conditions in banking markets. In this case, we proxy market 
competition by focusing on market concentration in each country as indicated by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). Sørensen and Werner (2006), for example, use the concentration ratio as 
a proxy for competition and conclude that banks operating in a less competitive environment make 
slower adjustments to interest rates (and therefore to net interest margins), which slows the 
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transmission of monetary policy changes to bank lending.11 We define markets as competitive with 
a HHI value below 1000 (the median value in our sample) and split the sample for the treatment 
and control groups. According to Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) low interest policy is likely to 
have a more limiting effect on bank lending in competitive markets because of the associated 
pressure on net interest margins. The results reported in panels G and H of Table 6 support this 
view: the impact of NIRP on bank lending in competitive markets is highly negative and 
statistically significant for the categories of gross loans and C&I loans, suggesting that banks in 
these markets have little option but to generate alternative income from other sources to maintain 
profitability. In more concentrated markets, the impact of NIRP is weaker suggested by smaller 
and less significant coefficients on NIRP-effect.  
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Beginning in 2012, several central banks adopted a negative interest rate policy aimed at boosting 
real spending by facilitating an increase in the supply and demand for loans. The policy generated 
controversy with skeptics pointing to several factors that might complicate the transmission from 
negative policy rates to higher bank lending. Empirical evidence on the impact of the policy is 
scant. In this paper, we provide new evidence that bank lending fared worse in NIRP-adopter 
countries than it did in countries that did not adopt the policy. Specifically, countries in which 
central banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in total bank lending relative to those 
countries in which central banks did not follow this policy. This result holds for gross bank lending 
and separately for mortgage and C&I lending, the key categories of bank lending, and is robust to 
the inclusion of several bank-specific control variables. It  also stands up in the face of a wide array 
                                               
11The US Department of Justice ‘generally considers markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500 points to 
be moderately concentrated, and consider markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 points to be highly 
concentrated’. https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index. We recognize that there are shortcomings 
with using the HHI as a proxy for competitive conditions. There are different views about competition and 
concentration in the literature. Claessens and Laeven (2003), for example, point out that there are some countries, such 
as USA, that show levels of monopolistic competition in banking despite the large number of banks, while countries 
like Canada are highly competitive, although the number of banks is relatively small. For this reason we also cross-
checked using Boone and Lerner indicators. These estimations are available upon request.   
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of robustness checks, including controlling for the effects of other aspects of UMP, developments 
in loan demand across countries, for possible bank funding constraints, and to (possible) changes 
in bank behavior prior to the introduction of NIRP. Finally, our results are relevant to the validity 
of the ‘reverse interest rate hypothesis’ developed recently by Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) in 
that bank-specific factors (capitalization, funding structure, business model, interest rate exposure, 
competitive conditions) appear to reduce banks’ willingness to lend in a  negative interest rate 
setting.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: treatment and control groups 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in our analysis for both the treatment and the control 
groups. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, bank balance sheet data 
and macroeconomic condition and monetary policy variables, respectively. GL_GR is the yearly logarithm growth 
rate of loans plus loan-loss reserves; MORT_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of mortgage loans; CL_GR is the 
yearly logarithm growth rate of commercial and industrial loans. Log(TA) is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. 
E/TA is the ratio of bank equity to total assets. ROE is the ratio of bank pre-tax profits to total equity. Liquidity is the 
ratio of bank liquid asset to total assets. Capital is bank’s total capital ratio. Income_Structure is the ratio of bank 
interest income to total income. Funding_Structure is the ratio of bank deposit funding to total liabilities. HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Output_gap is the yearly forecasted Output Gap. CPI_forecast is the yearly forecasted 
Consumer Price Index. GDP_GR is the yearly growth rate of real GDP. Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index 
in percentage. Unemployment is the rate of yearly unemployment in percentage. CB_GR is the monthly logarithm 
growth rate of central bank balance sheet size. M0_GR is the logarithm growth rate of the money supply M0. Deposit 
Rate is the country level aggregate deposit rate in percentage. Loan Demand is the monthly credit demand indices 
constructed from data from ECB and Federal Reserve loan demand surveys.   
 
I. Treatment group:  II. Control group 
             
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max   
Panel A: Bank Lending            
GL_GR 7543 -0.04 0.41 -9.73 8.54  15704 0.03 0.45 -10.17 7.31   
MORT_GR 3795 -0.03 0.39 -7.00 7.90  5938 0.02 0.50 -9.13 7.71   
CL_GR 3259 -0.11 0.54 -6.96 4.83  8018 0.02 0.61 -8.25 6.76   
              
Panel B: Bank Balance Sheet Data            
Log(TA) 8138 13.77 2.12 3.94 21.72  18700 14.07 2.38 2.95 21.90   
E/TA 8136 10.48% 5.71% 3.83% 24.93%  17703 11.74% 6.56% 3.83% 24.93%   
ROE 8099 4.56% 4.40% 0.00% 16.83%  18261 6.27% 5.18% 0.00% 16.83%   
Liquidity 7895 21.76% 15.12% 0.90% 46.94%  17264 20.67% 15.44% 0.90% 46.94%   
Capital 5700 18.38% 4.57% 11.00% 26.30%  11302 17.40% 4.59% 11.00% 26.30%   
Income_Structure 7881 6.67% 5.69% 0.00% 16.99%  18261 4.97% 5.05% 0.00% 16.99%   
Funding_Structure 7465 64.61% 20.30% 20.40% 85.32%  14752 65.06% 20.98% 20.40% 85.32%   
HHI 10092 855 536 453 3777  56608 446 397 249 4237   
              
Panel C: Macroeconomic Conditions and Monetary Policy          
Output_gap 20456 -2.09% 2.64% -15.09% 0.56%  45588 -2.36% 1.04% -6.03% 2.70%   
CPI_forecast 20456 1.00% 1.08% -1.39% 5.65%  46244 1.50% 1.17% -0.87% 8.89%   
GDP growth 10092 0.41% 0.66% -0.19% 6.62%  56604 0.44% 0.28% -1.13% 1.89%   
Inflation 10092 0.43% 0.77% -1.73% 4.39%  56608 1.51% 1.14% -1.73% 8.93%   
Unemployment 4978 7.91% 4.71% 4.50% 26.30%  45047 7.34% 2.51% 3.1% 27.20%   
 24 
CB_GR 5700 -0.02 0.15 -0.41 0.35  46991 0.09 0.16 -0.66 0.45   
M0_GR 6588 8.07 10.17 -4.55 20.12  51648 9.51 9.22 -26.63 51.56   
Deposit Rate 1962 0.50% 0.57% -0.18% 1.41%  5512 3.38% 4.83% 0.03% 16.77%   
Loan Demand 8360 15.74 13.85 -22.92 48.33  46772 10.40 16.00 -68.33 23.10   
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Table 2. Average bank lending measured by gross loans, mortgage loans and C&I loans before 
and after NIRP at country level. 
 
This table displays country level average lending growth rates before and after NIRP for NIRP-affected (Panel A) and 
NIRP-non-affected countries (Panel B). GL_GR is the yearly average growth rate of loans plus loan-loss reserves 
before and after NIRP introduction in NIRP-affected and NIRP non-affected countries. MORT_GR is the yearly 
average growth rate of mortgage loans before and after NIRP introduction in NIRP-affected and NIRP non-affected 
countries. CL_GR is the yearly average growth rate of commercial and industrial loans in NIRP affected and NIRP 
non-affected countries. 
 
 
Panel A: NIRP-affected Countries 
   
   
 GL_GR MORT_GR 
 
CL_GR 
  Before After P-value Before After P-value Before After P-value 
Austria 1.73% -3.94% 0.000 1.27% -7.83% 0.029 2.32% -8.22% 0.000 
Belgium 2.02% 1.41% 0.764 4.01% -7.23% 0.458 -4.96% -8.73% 0.631 
Denmark 1.86% -5.56% 0.000 2.88% -9.36% 0.002 0.84% -13.39% 0.061 
Estonia 2.48% 3.81% 0.794 0.05% -1.23% 0.843 1.93% 3.76% 0.891 
Finland 1.71% -0.82% 0.285 2.12% -5.33% 0.077 -5.59% -6.10% 0.943 
France 2.56% -3.58% 0.000 -2.09% -3.09% 0.497 0.04% -7.88% 0.001 
Germany 3.45% -2.49% 0.000 1.95% -3.07% 0.000 1.51% -8.36% 0.000 
Greece -0.24% -0.29% 0.993 1.74% -4.98% 0.515 -2.95% -5.39% 0.793 
Hungary 1.97% -5.71% 0.003 1.20% -7.66% 0.211 -3.18% -16.20% 0.026 
Ireland 1.73% -8.09% 0.000 -1.32% -14.10% 0.000 3.37% -11.51% 0.144 
Italy 2.11% -6.19% 0.000    26.02% -15.79% 0.207 
Luxembourg 5.00% 0.52% 0.015    2.70% -8.99% 0.043 
Netherland 1.80% -3.82% 0.006 1.80% -7.76% 0.000 1.18% -5.02% 0.233 
Norway 6.75% -10.46% 0.000 9.98% -10.27% 0.039 8.45% -10.43% 0.000 
Portugal 0.07% -6.81% 0.000 0.27% -8.51% 0.000 1.16% -15.27% 0.004 
Slovakia 3.09% 1.20% 0.582 1.81% 3.61% 0.802 4.32% -7.11% 0.036 
Slovenia 2.43% -8.84% 0.001 4.01% -4.53% 0.216 -1.29% -20.74% 0.019 
Spain 1.51% -5.72% 0.000 -1.36% -7.40% 0.193 5.62% -1.26% 0.197 
Sweden 4.40% -1.31% 0.000 1.00% -0.32% 0.698 6.91% -6.75% 0.005 
Switzerland 3.83% 3.41% 0.497 12.52% 3.78% 0.150 4.28% 3.11% 0.923 
Average 2.51% -3.16% 0.000 1.79% -5.29% 0.000 2.64% -8.51% 0.000 
 
 
Panel B: NIRP-non-affected Countries 
   
   
 GL_GR MORT_GR 
 
CL_GR 
  Before After P-value Before After P-value Before After P-value 
Australia 3.20% -10.04% 0.000 3.63% -9.65% 0.000 8.73% -10.52% 0.000 
Canada 4.22% -0.85% 0.001 5.42% 1.50% 0.088 4.38% -1.89% 0.047 
 26 
Chile 8.75% -4.89% 0.000 9.26% -1.59% 0.009 8.83% -3.66% 0.003 
Czech R. 3.75% -3.16% 0.040 -0.18% 7.65% 0.349 -5.59% 6.06% 0.218 
Iceland 2.14% 4.60% 0.656    -5.37% 6.13% 0.143 
Israel 3.74% 1.20% 0.486 1.03% 6.11% 0.395 -2.96% -3.85% 0.871 
Korea 2.61% 6.28% 0.101 -6.81% -4.31% 0.834 3.39% 10.74% 0.085 
Mexico 7.25% 6.86% 0.821 6.98% -0.33% 0.008 7.90% 8.60% 0.783 
N. Zealand 1.43% 6.11% 0.188 3.57% 4.70% 0.800 -1.27% 5.30% 0.381 
Poland 5.41% -1.18% 0.000 4.09% 7.61% 0.507 5.57% 4.05% 0.755 
Turkey 6.90% 4.32% 0.231 7.94% -2.02% 0.038 4.28% 8.91% 0.230 
UK 3.35% 4.46% 0.340 1.73% 2.44% 0.667 2.91% -6.70% 0.001 
USA 2.22% 10.60% 0.000 4.10% 7.37% 0.011 1.12% 13.85% 0.000 
Average 4.23% 1.87% 0.226 3.40% 1.62% 0.400 2.46% 2.85% 0.891 
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Table 3. Propensity score estimation: Probit model 
 
This table displays the PSM probit estimation results. The dependent variables are GL_GR (annual logarithm growth 
rate of loans plus loan-loss reserves), MORT_GR (annual logarithm growth rate of mortgage loans), and CL_GR 
(annual logarithm growth rate of commercial and industrial loans). Output_gap is the yearly forecasted Output Gap. 
CPI_forecast is the yearly forecasted Consumer Price Index. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capital 
is bank’s total capital ratio. ROE is the ratio of bank pre-tax profits to total equity. Robust standard errors clustered 
by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
    
        
  GL_GR MORT_GR CL_GR 
    
Output_gap -0.0054 0.2152*** 0.1918*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0123) (0.0094) 
CPI_forecast -0.2725*** -0.6013*** -0.2836*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0347) (0.0298) 
Size -0.1697*** -0.2725*** -0.1305*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0174) (0.0134) 
Capital -0.0430*** -0.0920*** -0.0954*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0076) (0.0049) 
ROE -0.0782*** -0.1095*** -0.1191*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0062) (0.0045) 
Observations 11889 4921 5753 
Pseudo R square 0.1512 0.4057 0.3097 
Log Likelihood -6182.20 -1341.10 -2648.64 
LR test ( chi square) 2203.35 1831.27 2376.69 
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Table 4. Baseline Regression  
 
This table displays the baseline regression results of the impact of NIRP on bank lending. The dependent variables are 
GL_GR (annual logarithm growth rate of loans plus loan-loss reserves), MORT_GR (annual logarithm growth rate of 
mortgage loans), and CL_GR (annual logarithm growth rate of commercial and industrial loans). NIRP-effect is the 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP implementation, 0 
otherwise. All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  GL_GR MORT_GR CL_GR 
    
NIRP-effect -0.0866*** -0.0540** -0.0641** 
 (0.0054) (0.0218) (0.0226) 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y 
Observations 22015 9525 10869 
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Table 5. Robustness Checks 
 
This table displays the effect of NIRP on bank lending controlling for monetary policy and other factors. Panel A 
(Monetary Policy) controls for unconventional monetary policies; Panel B (Loan Demand) controls for credit demand 
shocks; Panel C (EU only) includes only European countries so the control group includes only European non-NIRP 
adopters; Panel D (Without Denmark and Switzerland) remove Denmark and Switzerland; Panel E (Placebo Test) 
estimates the effect of NIRP on bank lending by modelling a false NIRP intervention. NIRP-effect is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP implementation, 0 otherwise. GL_GR 
is the yearly logarithm growth rate of loans plus loan-loss reserves; MORT_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of 
mortgage loans; CL_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of commercial and industrial loans. CB_GR is the monthly 
logarithm growth rate of central bank balance sheet size. Loan Demand is the monthly credit demand indices 
constructed from data from ECB and Federal Reserve loan demand surveys. All regressions include fixed country and 
time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by bank in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
A.   Monetary Policy    
     
 GL_GR MORT_GR CL_CR  
  NIRP-effect -0.0843*** -0.0583** -0.0521*  
 (0.0059) (0.0225) (0.0217)  
  CB_GR 0.1750*** 0.2040*** 0.1440***  
 (0.0079) (0.0181) (0.0245)  
  N. Obs 21763 9340 10288  
     
B.   Loan Demand    
     
 GL_GR MORT_GR CL_CR Loan_Demand 
      NIRP-effect -0.1160*** -0.0658 -0.1830*** 1.2310*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0358) (0.0299) (0.0240) 
           Loan_Demand -0.0336*** -0.0113 0.0036  
 (0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0080)  
                  N.Obs 11070 6821 8251 13121 
     
C.   EU Only    
     
 GL_GR MORT_GR CL_CR  
          NIRP-effect -0.0401*** -0.0755** 0.0481*  
 (0.0084) (0.0247) (0.0209)  
                  N.Obs 16499 7249 7497  
     
D.   Without Denmark and Switzerland    
     
 GL_GR MORT_GR CL_CR  
          NIRP-effect -0.0875*** -0.0620** -0.0781***  
 (0.0053) (0.0192) (0.0207)  
          N.Obs 20643 8415 10820  
     
E.   Placebo Test      
     
 GL_GR MORT_GR CL_CR  
  NIRP-effect 0.0270*** 0.0274 0.0165  
 (0.0309) (0.0524) (0.0515)  
  N.Obs 9627 6710 8148  
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Table 6. NIRP and bank lending, bank capitalization, funding structure and business model 
 
This table displays the results of NIRP on bank lending based on bank and country sub-sample analyses. Panel A 
(Undercapitalized) and Panel B (Well-capitalized) show the results of NIRP on bank lending for banks that have total 
capital ratios above or below the median, respectively. Panel C (Retail Funding Based) and Panel D (Wholesale 
Funding Based) represent the results of NIRP on bank lending for banks that have an amount of retail deposits greater 
(Retail Funding Based) or lower (Wholesale Funding Based) than 50% of total liabilities. Panel E (Interest earnings-
based) and F (Fee-based) illustrate the results of NIRP on bank lending for bank that have interest earnings as share 
of total earnings above (Interest earning-based) or below (Fee-based) the median. Panel G (Competitive markets) and 
Panel H (Concentrated markets) show the results of NIRP on bank lending for banks that have a HHI value below 
(Competitive markets) or above (Concentrated markets) the median. NIRP-effect is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP implementation, 0 otherwise. GL_GR is the yearly 
logarithm growth rate of loans plus loan-loss reserves; MORT_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of mortgage 
loans; CL_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of commercial and industrial loans. All regressions include fixed 
country and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by bank in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 GL_GR MORT_GR 
 
CL_GR 
A. Undercapitalized    
     
    NIRP-effect -0.1060*** -0.0808* -0.1570*** 
     (0.0115) (0.0398) (0.0427) 
    No. of observations 7784 3697 4638 
B. Well-capitalized    
     
     NIRP-effect -0.0521*** 0.0207 0.0924* 
     (0.0099) (0.0340) (0.0367) 
    No. of observations 7560 3689 4214 
C. Retail Funding Based    
     
     NIRP-effect -0.0834*** -0.137*** -0.0531* 
 (0.0118) (0.0387) (0.0297) 
    No. of observations 10290 3686 4058 
D. Wholesale Funding Based    
     
      NIRP-effect -0.0665*** -0.0228 -0.0278 
     (0.0092) (0.0274) (0.0439) 
    No. of observations 9839 5561 6088 
E. Interest earnings-based    
     
     NIRP-effect -0.0732*** -0.1780*** -0.6400*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0194) (0.0283) 
    No. of observations 8383 5459 4989 
F. Fee-based    
     
    NIRP-effect 0.00991 -0.0725 -0.0517 
     (0.0414) (0.0727) (0.0611) 
    No. of observations 8781 1921 3253 
G. Competitive markets    
     
     NIRP-effect -0.1420*** -0.0826 -0.2110*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0524) (0.0515) 
    No. of observations 10872 5852 7652 
H. Concentrated markets    
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     NIRP-effect -0.0623* 0.0105 -0.0975** 
     (0.0204) (0.1220) (0.0501) 
    No. of observations 11538 3659 3189 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1. Time of Adoption of NIRP.  
  
Country NIRP adoption date 
Austria June 2014            
Belgium June 2014   
Denmark July 2012   
Estonia June 2014   
Finland June 2014   
France June 2014   
Germany June 2014   
Greece June 2014   
Hungary March 2014   
Ireland June 2014   
Italy June 2014   
Luxembourg June 2014   
Netherlands June 2014   
Norway September 2015   
Portugal June 2014   
Slovakia June 2014   
Slovenia June 2014   
Spain June 2014   
Sweden February 2015   
Switzerland January 2015   
 
 
